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A critical look at history is an important, if not indispensable element of any attempt to evaluate
future risks and opportunities. This also holds true for policies aimed at trade and investment
relations between the US and Europe. The two papers by Hufbauer/Neumann and Sapir provide
diﬀerently focused accounts of the history and signiﬁcance of EU/US trade disputes, juxtaposed
with some empirics of trade and foreign investment. I ﬁnd them very illuminating, interesting to
read, and thought-provoking. I see no immediate policy proposal on US-EU trade and investment
issues that can be drawn from their analyses, but in my view that is a virtue: They make us
think further, instead of jumping to quick conclusions and swift action. I start oﬀ with a brief
interpretation of what I see as the main messages of the two papers, before presenting some
complementary evidence, as well as critical remarks and developing a few ideas of my own.
Hufbauer/Neumann portray an empirical picture according to which US/EU trade ﬂows
and foreign investment show signs of mature stability. In the 1990s, cross-atlantic trade and
investment have been rising in line with general economic globalization, but there is little in-
dication of dramatic change. This is not to say there are no opportunities to miss. Indeed,
Hufbauer/Neumann stress that there is signiﬁcant scope for mutual gains from further liberal-
ization. Moreover, even though there was no landslide-type change in the 90s, I will show below
that a closer inspection of their data does reveal a few interesting developments that are worth
pointing out.
As regards trade conﬂicts, a principal message is that they generally aﬀect only a relatively
small portion of existing impediments. But again, this does not say that such conﬂicts are
inconsequential. For various reasons — some of which are also stressed by Sapir — bilateral EU-
US conﬂicts are important much beyond their quantitative signiﬁcance. In particular, they are
instrumental in propelling or impeding cooperation between the two Unions, and they are of
vital importance also through their signaling eﬀect to third countries, and to the world-trading-
system as a whole.
In their analysis, Hufbauer/Neumann propose a categorization which distinguishes market
access disputes from industrial policy conﬂicts, and sets these two apart from a third category
of dissent which lies in the realm of ideology. Market access disputes are characterized by
a relatively low policy-proﬁle, and by direct reliance on the WTO-DSM (dispute settlement
mechanism). According to Hufbauer/Neumann, they have little potential to disrupt trade in any
fundamental way. Trade disputes may, however, also extend into the realm of industrial policy
which gives them a higher policy proﬁle, while at the same time making them less amenable to
the WTO-DSM. Moreover, they carry more disruptive potential, unless dealt with under what
Hufbauer/Neumann call a “modus vivendi” (see below).
2The conﬂicts that Hufbauer/Neumann list under these two categories are also dealt with by
Sapir, but my reading of Sapir is that he would categorize individual cases diﬀerently. Thus he
would probably call the steel case an industrial policy dispute, while Hufbauer/Neumann treat
it under the market access category. Moreover, by comparing the trade disputes of the 80s with
those of the 90s, Sapir points out that it is not the issue as such which makes a dispute amenable
to the legal provisions of the multilateral system. Speciﬁcally, certain issues can be drawn into
the legal framework by a change in that framework. I shall return to this below.
The ideology-class of conﬂict clearly lies beyond the traditional WTO-domain. In these
conﬂicts, commercial and economic interests are of only secondary importance. Basically, under
this category trade policy is used as a vehicle to achieve non-economic ends, related to world-
power-politics, the environment, human rights, or social and labor standards. These issues
are not dealt with by Sapir who is less prepared to venture into issues of the future than
Hufbauer/Neumann.
Against the background of this classiﬁcation, Hufbauer/Neumann oﬀer an outlook and some
suggestions regarding future cooperation and convergence between the US and the EU. First,
they see no likely scenario of escalation in any of the three categories considered. Regarding
market access conﬂicts they suggest that both parties take WTO-rulings more seriously, and
that they resort to ad-hoc arbitration where the WTO-DSM is not directly helpful or relevant.
As to industrial policy conﬂicts, they seem to favor negotiated solutions and cooperation, but
see little hope for much progress. Their likely scenario is a persistence of the “modus vivendi”
approach.
On ideological conﬂicts, they are even more sceptical. My reading of their conclusion in this
part is that they are sceptical on both positive and normative accounts. Not only will negotiated
convergence be much more diﬃcult to achieve, but it may also be a less desirable objective to
pursue, fundamentally, than cooperation in matters of industrial policy. I will argue below, that
certain caveats are also warranted for industrial policy cooperation.
While Hufbauer/Neumann concentrate on the most recent episode of conﬂicts in the 90s,
Sapir oﬀers an interesting juxtaposition of the two episodes in the early 80s and the late 90s,
identifying similarities, but also important diﬀerences. He explains the signiﬁcant increase in the
number of trade disputes in the 80s by a) an unfavorable macroeconomic environment (exchange
rate misalignments, economic downturns, accumulating trade imbalances) and b) ambiguities in
the GATT subsidies code agreed upon in the Tokyo-round. As regards the sectoral incidence
of disputes, there is a major parallel: In both episodes agriculture and steel are the principal
subjects of disagreement and conﬂict, although the issues and instruments have changed.
As regards the instruments used, the earlier episode features little use of GATT-rules which
3were by-passed by “grey-area” measures (basically voluntary restraint agreements, VRAs). In
the 90s, due to the success of the Uruguay-round, some trade disputes were brought back into for-
mal use of WTO-rules (particularly “safeguard-measures” under Article XIX). But Sapir points
out that this is no clear success story at all: There is now a tradition of non-compliance to WTO-
rulings, and Article XIX has turned out to put industrial policies under a time-inconsistency
problem; see below.
Sapir also oﬀers an interesting numerical view on dispute cases in each episode. The signiﬁ-
cance of both the US and the EU has diminished in the overall picture of GATT/WTO-disputes,
being more closely in line with the pattern of trade in the 90s than was the case in the 80s.
Moreover, the relative frequency of bilateral EU/US litigation has diminished as well. A par-
ticular feature, which is very important and characteristic of the 90s, is that both the US and
the EU are more heavily engaged in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), and that almost no
litigation took place with PTA-partner countries. Indeed, the use of PTAs to solve, or avoid,
trade conﬂicts is a notable feature of the international trading-system that has evolved in the
90s. This point is not taken up by Hufbauer/Neumann and not pursued any further by Sapir,
which is regrettable. I will take this up brieﬂyb e l o w .
2 On the empirics of US-EU trade and investment
On the empirical side, I agree that there have been no landslide changes in US-EU trade and
investment in the 90s. But the Hufbauer/Neumann data reveal a few interesting points worth
mentioning.1 First, although the EU is not much smaller than the US (indeed, bigger in terms
of population, while slightly smaller in terms of GDP) it is still signiﬁcantly more open in terms
of external trade as a share of GDP (excluding intra-EU international trade): 18.3 percent (19.6
percent) for exports (imports) of goods and services, compared to 10.8 percent (14.6 percent)
for the US. More importantly, both shares have risen markedly during the 90s for the EU, from
15.3 percent for exports and from 13.3 percent for imports. There is thus no aggregate sign of
trade diversion (or of a fortress Europe) due to the single market program of 1992.
Contrary to what might have been expected, there is also no aggregate sign of EU-trade
diversion from the cross-atlantic route to eastern Europe. Thus, the share of EU exports going
to the US rose from 14.2 percent in 1990 to 21.1 percent in 2000, although if expressed as a
share in US imports the same ﬁgures amount to a small reduction from 22.1 to 20.9 percent. EU
1All of the ﬁgures that I present in this section are calculated from Tables 1,2 and 4 in Hufbauer & Neumann
(2002).
4imports coming from the US have remained stable at 16.6 percent if expressed as a share of total
EU imports, but have fallen slightly from 25.6 percent to 24 percent if expressed as a share of
overall US exports. The diminishing importance during the last decade of the EU as a source of
US imports and a destination of US exports reﬂects trade eﬀects from NAFTA. Both the US and
the EU have been engaged in deepening and extending their respective trade blocs, but on the
aggregate level the expected trade eﬀects — increasing intra-bloc trade and lower external trade
— so far show up only for the US. However, it is worth taking at least one step of disaggregatin.
In services trade, the EU has gained importance as a destination of US exports (from 28.2 to
31.6 percent), although the US as a source of EU services imports has fallen (from 17.2 to 16.2
percent). In sum, we observe a marked increase in the role of the US as a destination of EU
exports, a slightly diminishing role of the EU as a destination of US merchandise exports, with
an increasing role of the EU for US services exports, and more or less constant shares of the two
regions as origins in respective imports.
Sapir notes that bilateral EU-US trade is of little importance for both regions. The relevant
ﬁgure to look at here is trade relative to GDP. But here again, one can note an interesting detail.
Trade was about equally important for both regions in 1990 (between 2.2 and 2.5 percent), but
by the end of the 90s an asymmetry has arisen on the export side: Exports to the US amount
to 3.9 percent of EU GDP, while exports to the EU amount to only 2.6 percent of US GDP.
This diﬀerence is mainly due to merchandise trade. For services exports, the shares are roughly
equal for both regions (around 1 percent).
Some noteworthy change can also be detected in FDI. The US does seem to lose importance
as a host country for EU outward investment (down to 25.8 percent from 28.9 percent). Here,
the opening up of eastern Europe in the 1990s certainly plays a role. But these same ﬁgures
amount to an increase in the EU as a source of US inward FDI (from 57.9 percent to 64.8
percent). At the same time, the EU has also gained importance as a host to US outward foreign
direct investment (up to 46.1 percent from 42.7 percent), while these same stocks have slightly
fallen relative to all EU inward FDI (from 24.9 percent to 24.1 percent). In sum, the EU has
become a more important FDI-partner for the US, while the US has lost some of its importance
as an FDI-partner for the EU. The data seem to suggest that the EU has only recently caught
up to the US in terms of the overall importance of its external FDI activity.
3 Gains from further liberalization
Hufbauer/Neumann cite evidence from numerical simulations suggesting that there is room for
further increase in bilateral trade in the course of future trade liberalization. The results reported
5are from a CGE exercise which is based on a scenario of abolishing post-Uruguay-round MFN
tariﬀs plus service barriers. Two things are worth pointing out.
First the relevant tariﬀsa r er a t h e rl o w ,a n dt h e yv a r ya c r o s sr e g i o n s ,w i t ht h eU Sa n dt h eE U
both among the low-tariﬀ regions. According to non-weighted tariﬀ averages calculated by the
Worldbank, the US and the EU presently apply average import tariﬀs in the vicinity of no more
5 to 6 percent. For manufactures they are lower (about 4 percent) than for agricultural goods.
Interestingly, agricultural tariﬀ protection is not much higher in the EU (10 percent) than in
the US (8.7 percent), but it does entail more tariﬀ escalation.2 The OECD (1997) calculates
production-weighted averages of 7.7 (10.7) and 5.2 (7.9) percent for overall trade (agricultural
trade) for the EU and the US, respectively.
Brown et al. (2001) use a CGE model of world trade to calculate the trade and production
eﬀects, as well as the welfare eﬀects of a multilateral removal of post-Uruguay-round tariﬀs. Huf-
bauer/Neumann seem to be more comfortable with the trade eﬀects than with the welfare eﬀects.
The latter are indeed quite staggering: an increase in US welfare in the amount of 5.4 percent of
GDP for the US, with a corresponding ﬁgure of 6.2 percent for the EU (including EFTA). The
usual explanation for such high estimates invokes “modern trade theory elements” incorporated
in such models (scale economies, pro-competitive eﬀects). In this regard, Hufbauer/Neumann
indicate some scepticism and argue that these eﬀects should be treated as upper bounds. I
would argue that the trade eﬀects calculated by Hufbauer/Neumann should similarly be seen as
pretty much an upper bound. The reason is that the underlying scenario is one of multilateral
liberalization where, as argued above, the EU and the US are both low-tariﬀ-regions. The over-
all trade eﬀects calculated for these two regions therefore also reﬂect tariﬀ reductions by other
high-tariﬀ-regions, and it seems questionable to conclude increased bilateral EU-US trade on a
pro-rata-basis from these overall trade eﬀects.
The second point I want to raise is that the tariﬀ liberalization scenario captures only a
relatively small fraction of trade policy. Speciﬁcally, it leaves out much of what both papers
discuss in their accounts of trade disputes. Nor does it cover dispute-prone issues where trade
policy is used to tackle new challenges (labor standards, environment); see for instance Bhagwati
(2002) and Irwin (2002). For several reasons, these issues are diﬃcult to cover in a CGE exercise.
Trade impediments arising in such disputes are often of a non-tariﬀ form, and they are typically
temporary in nature. Both makes them less amenable to formal modeling than plain MFN tariﬀs
that remain in existence until explicitly negotiated in the next round of trade talks. Nonetheless,
2Finger et al. (1996) have 2.2 percent for the US and 3.7 percent for the EU (quoted from Irwin (2002, p.
181)). The above data are from http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/TR_Data.html
6they surely play a role in shaping the future trading environment.
I would be hard pressed to say whether leaving them out in the computational scenario
makes the trade eﬀects upward- or downward-biased. Hufbauer/Neumann argue that the more
classic trade disputes “pick only at the edges of existing barriers”. Hence, one might argue
that they make little diﬀerence to the multilateral liberalization scenario. However, the point
is that the general prevalence of, or the perceived likelihood of getting caught in, such disputes
might well act like a permanent trade restriction. Hence if the frequent occurrence of such
disputes also in the more recent episode of cross-atlantic trade development, as documented in
both Hufbauer/Neumann and Sapir, can be turned around and brought down, this would most
probably have a trade and welfare enhancing eﬀect beyond the numbers reported from CGE
analyses. On the other hand, if governments should exhibit an increased and ﬁrm willingness
to use trade policy towards macroeconomic or industrial policy objectives, and to new issues in
the area social and environmental policy, or even ideological issues, then this would amount to
a severe trade depressing force not captured by CGE analyses. We seem to be left with two
neglected issues which involve potentially oﬀsetting risks for trade.
A ﬁnal point to note here is that some of some non-tariﬀ measures argued about in such
disputes, violate the free trade idea not as trade impeding forces, but by means subsidizing
trade. Agriculture is a classic example. Getting rid of them almost certainly increases welfare,
but it may reduce, rather than increase, actual trade. The welfare potential for future trade
liberalization (including a reduction of trade subsidies) should therefore not be associated too
c l o s e l yw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nt r a d eﬂows. Overall, though, I fully agree with Hufbauer/Neumann
that, low bilateral trade shares in each region’s GDP notwithstanding, a more free-trade-oriented
posture of trade policy should entail non-negligible welfare gains for both the US and the EU.
4 US and EU regionalism
While economists stress the gains from multilateral trade liberalization, policy makers often
place more hope on regional agreements. For the US, this is for instance witnessed by plans
to erect a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005, and by negotiations, scheduled
for completion in summer 2002, towards a bilateral free trade agreement with Chile. On the
European side, in addition to eastern enlargement, examples include the Euro-Mediterranean
trade initiative (“Barcelona process”), an FTAw i t hS o u t hA f r i c aa n dt h eC o t o n o uA g r e e m e n t
with the ACP-countries. More recently, the EU is seeking to extend its PTA initiatives into the
US sphere of inﬂuence (Mexico, Chile and Mercosur). It remains to be seen whether this entails
a potential for EU-US conﬂict.
7But even if their respective regionalisms should not cause much trade conﬂict between the
US and the EU, this does not mean that they are conducive to good and beneﬁcial world trade
policy as a whole. The Vinerian caveat of trade diversion is still relevant, and it does not
always appear to receive due attention in policy makers’ readiness to engage in regional trade
negotiations. Moreover, the multitude of simultaneous PTAs in the form of free trade areas (as
opposed to customs unions) generates a policy environment characterized by complex rules of
origin which are liable to be abused with protectionist intent; see Bhagwati et al. (1998). On the
other hand, Ethier (1998a and 1998b) points out that the “new regionalism” of the 1990s, for
which the afore-mentioned PTAs independently pursued by the EU and the US are prototype
examples, is diﬀerent in important respects from earlier instances of regionalism, and he argues
that these diﬀerences make US- and EU-type regionalisms less damaging to the world-trading-
system than may appear from a Vinerian perspective.
As regards bilateral US-EU trade disputes, one can envisage diﬀerent scenarios, with cor-
respondingly diﬀering verdicts. If, for whatever reason, trade with respective regional partners
can be pursued with less conﬂict than EU-US trade, then such PTAs might lead to a dimin-
ished perceived importance of EU-US trade disputes, on both sides of the Atlantic. In a sense,
these disputes may in time be “marginalized” and defused. On the one hand, this seems like
a welcome development for the multilateral trading system. On the other hand, one can also
argue that, with the EU and the US losing interest in each other’s violation of free trade, they
would no longer play their roles as mutual vigilantes with the same eﬀort. And if there are
no other regions with suﬃcient power and incentives to step in, this would make it easier for
both to maintain protectionist policies. This could be reinforded by tailoring ones own PTA
environment so as to avoid any interference with these policies.
An alternative scenario is that such PTAs could draw other regions into existing EU-US
conﬂicts. Instead of being “marginalized”, these conﬂicts would then gain importance, putting
more strain on the multilateral trading system. Indeeds, PTAs might even raise new issues of
conﬂict that have nothing to do, directly, with EU-US trade. The EU banana regime which is
related to the Cotonou-ACP agreement is a case in point.
The verdict must also depend on whether such PTAs are genuine free trade areas with
signiﬁcant scope for beneﬁcial trade, or whether they include crucial exemptions, so that a large
part of the gains-from-trade potential remains just that: a potential. The evidence is that PTAs
often contain sectoral exemptions (the usual sensitive sectors: agriculture, textiles, steel). More
generally, if such PTAs are largely tailored to serve special interest groups in the respective
countries, then they must be seen as a harmful setback for the case of beneﬁcial multilateral
trade liberalization.
85 On categorizing trade disputes
In their analysis of trade conﬂicts, Hufbauer/Neumann apply a categorization that distinguishes
market access from industrial policy conﬂicts and ideological disputes. I found this illuminating,
but I kept wondering whether from a trade theory point of view it would seem more appropriate
to categorize the speciﬁcm e a s u r e sin use, rather than the conﬂict as such. In some sense this
is implicit in categorizing conﬂicts, but the main lines of reasoning are more revealing if speciﬁc
measures are at the center of analysis. A categorization that comes to mind here is Bhagwati’s
(1988) distinction between “high-track” and “low-track” actions. I do not want to go into details
here, but a few complementary remarks may be worthwhile, doing little more than just point out
certain criteria that are important to judge the potential damage arising from a certain trade
policy instrument.
First, there is the issue of whether an instrument is rule-based versus rule-bypassing. Trade
economists normally have a clear preference for rule-basedness. A safeguard tariﬀ is rule-based,
while a VRA is not. The analysis by Sapir suggests that to some extent the Uruguay round
seems to have been successful in getting issues back onto a rule-based track. However, I will
argue below that this is a mixed blessing.
Secondly, trade policy may be aimed at simply ﬁxing a rule, thereby implicitly accepting
whatever quantities of trade will emerge, or it may aim to directly ﬁx the (allowed) quantities
traded. Here again, trade economists have a clear preference for rule-ﬁxing over quantity ﬁxing.
Setting a tariﬀ ﬁxes a rule, while VRAs often amount to ﬁxing quantities. Of course, if a rule
is designed ﬂexibly enough, the diﬀerence may be elusive: One can ﬁx quantities implicitly by
adjusting the “rule” whenever the market outcome deviates from certain targeted quantities. In
my view, the safeguard provisions are liable to be used in this way.
Then there is the issue of industrial targeting which is typically prevalent in high-track
actions that often use voluntary restraint agreements, but also in safeguard actions. General
systems of subsidizing export credits, either through government guarantees or government-
sponsored agencies,lack this type of targeting. So does the US policy pertaining towards foreign
sales corporations. One might therefore argue that such policies should not be listed under
the industrial policy conﬂict category. The reason why Hufbauer/Neumann nonetheless do so,
I presume, is that they are often used as bargaining chips in a “modus vivendi” approach to
“solve” policy conﬂicts arising with respect to particular industries. An example for this is
“modus vivendi on farm supports in exchange for a modus vivendi on tax preference”.
A further criterion is the degree of “porousness”. Economists sometimes argue that voluntary
restraint agreements (VRAs) are often only moderately eﬃcacious in terms of causing harm,
because they literally invite hidden circumvention. In a benign interpretation, such measures
9may therefore pass the test in that they are a valuable element in a pro-trade government’s
policy portfolio which faces political-economy-type constraints; see Bhagwati (1988). If this is a
legitimate interpretation, then bringing industrial-policy-type trade disputes back into measures
based on WTO-rules, a feature of the more recent episode according to Sapir, would be a mixed
blessing. The reason simply is that such measures are typically less porous. I will add a further
caveat based on the observation of a de-facto susceptibility to a highly questionable “modus
vivendi” below.
Finally, there is the old concern that WTO-rules (speciﬁcally on safeguard, antidumping,
and countervailing duties) may be “captured and perverted” into plain protection which runs
counter to the potentially beneﬁcial role that they have been designed for in a well-functioning
world-trading-system; see Bhagwati (1988). This is perhaps the most diﬃcult criterion to apply,
for two reasons: First, the beneﬁcial role is hard to deﬁne — and views may diﬀer already on this
general level. And secondly, application to a speciﬁc case (say steel) is likely to suﬀer from all
sorts of empirical problems and problems of interpretation. The degree to which an abuse and
perversion of these rules takes place is, therefore, diﬃcult to measure.
But incentives can be identiﬁed, and set appropriately. Moreover, as emphasized by Bhagwati
(1988 and 2002), institutions can be designed to guarantee a balanced representations of all
interests involved (foreign and domestic, producer and consumer). The Byrd amendment is
probably not the kind of incentive one would like to set. On the other hand, the use of revenues
generated by such policies in a “closed-loop-way” towards plaintiﬀ-industries is not entirely
beyond economic rationale. This is particularly true if the ultimate aim is to aid structural
adjustment of the industries aﬀected by imports. However, as I will argue below, it is always a
somewhat dangerous to bring industrial policy issues on the trade policy agenda, and vice versa.
6 Negotiated progress versus “modus vivendi”
Hufbauer/Neumann see a continuation of the “modus vivendi” approach as the most likely future
course of transatlantic trade policy. Is there anything particularly bad about this approach?
What is the alternative? Hufbauer/Neumann don’t seem to ﬁnd anything terribly wrong with
the status quo, but they envisage a more ambitious alternative agenda where policy makers
might try to achieve negotiated convergence in matters of industrial policy. I should like to
voice moderate dissent on both accounts.
Without falling victim to perfection, I think the “modus vivendi” approach must be crit-
icized. What it amounts to, basically, is a mutual exchange of misbehavior and threats. In
all likelihood, this is coupled with repeated lack of compliance with WTO-rulings, hence it
10undermines Hufbauer/Neumann’s ﬁrst recommendation to make more honest attempts to rely
on WTO-dispute-settling. More fundamentally, it reﬂects a central weakness of the present
world-trading-system which I would describe as follows.
First, whether or not the WTO bites at all is put under the member countries’ discretion.
More speciﬁcally, whether a given violation of trading-rules by any one country is brought before
the WTO, depends on some partner becoming active in litigation. Hufbauer/Neumann argue
that this will be the case only if two conditions are met: a) an arguable violation plus b) a
commercial interest in litigation. And they say that these conditions are typically met only for
a small fraction of actual violations. Hence, a large part of violations remains un-sanctioned.
But I would go further in arguing that these conditions are not even suﬃcient for actual
litigation. They are necessary for a credible threat of litigation, but incentives may be such
that actual litigation ever takes place. If two countries mutually accumulate credible threats
of bilateral litigation, the expected pay-oﬀ s t r u c t u r em a yb es u c ht h a tas i t u a t i o nw h e r eb o t h
countries abstain from litigation is politically eﬃcient. It then boils down to whether or not a
cooperative non-litigation solution is sustainable. Even if litigation does take place and there
is a WTO-ruling, this may be followed by a mutual tolerance of non-compliance, which can
be seen as a more or less implicit exchange of granted retaliations.3 In such a case, the WTO
framework is abused as a vehicle of supporting violations of, rather than enforcing adherence
to, the idea of free trade. This is, admittedly, not a very benign way of reading the “modus
vivendi” approach, but it is not entirely inconsistent with the accounts of disputes given in the
two papers by Hufbauer/Neumann and Sapir.
Where, then, lies the alternative for future EU-US trade relations? Hufbauer/Neumann
envisage openly negotiated convergence on industrial policy conﬂicts. I have reservations here as
well. My fundamental point is that the trade policy table is the wrong place to form industrial
policy. I do not dispute that if any one country pursues an active industrial policy, then, in
a world of integrated markets, other countries will in some way be aﬀected. My point is that
going to the trade policy table too soon is likely to cause ill-guided policies. Industrial policy
should aim at correcting distortions, and trade economists have repeatedly pointed out that
such distortions are very seldom pure trade distortions. Tackling them with an eye on trade
3Bhagwati has recently suggested to calculate the monetary value of sanctions not by looking at the amount
of total trade aﬀected, but instead by using some measure of the gains from trade that are lost at the margin
through a given violation of free trade. See Jagdish Bhagwati, “Trade: The Unwinnable War”, The Financial
Times January 29, 2002. This might provide a partial solution also to the above mentioned problem, as it would
make the “market for retaliations” thinner.
11relations is likely to distract attention from the heart of the problem. This is not to say that
they should not be tackled on an international, or multilateral level. Everything depends on
whether the basic distortion (say increasing returns to scale) is national or international.4 If it
is international in scope, then negotiations should be conducted on an international level, but I
would suggest that they be carried out under auspices other than the WTO, so as to keep trade
concerns as such at a safe distance.
This does not mean that the WTO is useless. It has a key role to play in facilitating eﬃcient
outcomes if, for whatever reason, governments are unable or unwilling to abstain from exploiting
trade relations in pursuit of national policy goals. In general, this will involve some variant of
the term-of-trade eﬀect.5 Bagwell and Staiger (1998 and 1999) have shown that in such a world
there is an eﬃciency rationale for the WTO; I will return to this below. A more ambitious role
would be to prevent governments from pursuing such exploitative trade policies in the ﬁrst place.
According to this view, expressed for instance by Krugman (1993), the key role of WTO-like
international agreements is to shield governments from internal interest-group pressure. Thus,
political-economy-type constraints provide ample rationale for the WTO. But if looked at from a
normative perspective, the basic tenets of the WTO are much less convincing. Indeed, as shown
by Krugman (1991), they have a distinct mercantilist orientation, which should be kept at a
safe distance from EU-US (or indeed any international) negotiations on industrial policy issues.
An issue closely related to industrial policy is governments’ desire to support painful struc-
tural change. It cannot be ruled out that this may in some cases justify a “closed loop” channel-
ing of revenues generated by safeguard or anti-dumping measures towards plaintiﬀ industries,
although one should carefully watch the incentive structure. More fundamentally, however, a
trade policy approach towards facilitating and supporting structural change is ﬂawed. As noted
by Bhagwati (1988) and Feenstra (1998) it causes an unwarranted focus on damage caused by
imports, as opposed to pain caused by structural change as such. Whether or not trade plays
a role should not make a diﬀerence for the policy stance towards structural change. There is
a more subtle point which is rightly emphasized in the paper by Sapir: Trade policy options,
if formally laid down in international trade law (as with the safeguard provision), may put an
adjusmtent-oriented industrial policy under a problem of time-inconsistency. Hence, such an
approach might indeed impede, rather than support, structural change.
4There is a large body of theoretical literature dealing with both. See, for instance, Ethier (1982) on interna-
tional economies of scale, or Grossman & Helpman (1992) on international spillovers in R&D.
5Note that this includes all of the recent trade policy arguments based on imperfect competition; see Bhagwati
(2002, pp. 14-24).
12As regards the US and the EU, there is a double-asymmetry that may cause further problems
with negotiations on trade implications of industrial-policies. First, there is the oft-quoted
point that the EU has no government. Whatever the details worked out by the “constitutional
convent” installed at Laeken, the future EU will likely continue its present inter-governmental
approach, rather than establish strong federal structures. More importantly, while trade policy
has long been ﬁrmly entrenched as a common policy within the EU framework, the same is not
the case for industrial policy as a whole. Whatever the underlying reasons for this asymmetry, it
is not going to make negotiations on industrial-policy trade disputes easier. A similar asymmetry
explains why the EU is less prone than the US to use trade policy as a vehicle to pursue foreign
policy, or ideological objectives more generally. The reason quite simply is that — some recent
change and progress notwithstanding — there is also no common European foreign policy. I have
no ﬁrm opinion on whether this is lamentable from a European or world point of view. The
inability of the EU to rely on trade policy as a vehicle for a consistent European foreign policy
may be bad for foreign policy, but it is certainly not bad for trade policy.
7 On the ideological dimension
This brings me to ideology. Of course, ideology has many diﬀerent dimensions, but in almost all
dimensions that I can imagine, I fully agree with Hufbauer/Neumann that the US and the EU
should probably abstain from attempting to reach too much convergence. Such convergence may
evolve, but it is hard to imagine how it should be negotiated. Meanwhile, the two continents will
have to live with the fact that pursuing diﬀerent ideological positions will at times entail mutual
infringements via trade and investment. This holds true not only for classic issues of ideology
as the ones described by Hufbauer/Neumann, but also for some of the new challenges that have
come up in connection with the agenda of future trade negotiations (e.g. environment, labor
and social standards). Suﬃce it to say that such infringements could be signiﬁcantly reduced
by realizing that policy instruments pertaining to trade and investment are generally ineﬃcient
(second-best at most) to achieve speciﬁc goals related to these challenges; see Bhagwati (2002)
and Irwin (2002).
However, there is a diﬀerent issue related to ideology which, in my view, has not been suﬃ-
ciently acknowledged in discussions of the world-trading-system. Until 1989/90, the post-World-
War-II world-trading-system was essentially dichotomized. There was state-trading among so-
cialistic planning-economies on the one hand, and market-oriented trade (subject to the GATT)
among capitalistic “western” economies on the other, with very little trade between the two
blocs. Choosing between the two systems was largely seen as a matter of ideology. Supported
13by more recent events, however, one might argue that the apparent economic performance of the
two models has moved the choice from ideology into the realm of plain facts, with a clear win
for the capitalist system. Does this mean that world trade as a whole is no longer characterized
by an ideological divide, moving ever closer to the neoclassical textbook model?
This is true only up to a point. Ideological diﬀerences between countries are likely to pre-
vail, and I would argue that they are not adequately captured the theoretical paradigm that
— explicitly or implicitly — underlies our thinking on trade policy (disputes). Freeman (2001)
presents empirical evidence supporting the notion of capitalism as a concept which allows for
diversiﬁcation. While it is true that diﬀerent forms of capitalism show diﬀerences in economic
performance, there is no clear-cut dominance of one particular form over all others. The reason
is that performance has more than one dimension. The choice may then again be seen as one of
ideology, and the outcome, even in the long-run, most likely is a world of diversiﬁed capitalisms.
And pivotal to this choice are labor market institutions. To quote Freeman (2001): “The labor
market is potentially the most idiosyncratic market in advanced capitalism.”
Thus, suppose that the EU continues to adhere to its European form of capitalism where
welfare-state ideas are coupled with relatively rigid and centralized labor markets, while the US
adheres to its more extreme form of capitalism, hallmarked by free and ﬂexible labor markets.6
If the two forms were pursued in two isolated worlds, then this would pose no interesting trade
issue. However, the EU and the US are related to each other via trade and investment. Hence
the question: What does it imply for trade policy and the world-trading-system, if — due to deep-
rooted ideological diﬀerences or entrenched habits — they pursue diﬀerent models of capitalism,
each characterized by extreme forms of labor market institutions? Surprisingly, this question
has so far received relatively little attention from trade theorists. In particular, it has not played
a prominent role in economic treatments of the world-trading-system. I cannot present a full-
6The Lisbon summit of March 2000 has, admittedly, envisaged a somewhat diﬀerent future for the EU, whereby
deregulation and market liberalization are cornerstones of an economic catching-up strategy. A 10 year process
involving convergence to the US version of capitalism, so the Lisbon-credo, shall make the EU the most competitive
region of the world economy. However, the progress made so far seems to support my basic assumption: To the
extent that such convergence has started to materialize it relates to “classics” of regulated commodity markets
(electricity, telecommunications, postal services), while on labor markets new regulation has been introduced
which reinforces divergence from, rather than convergence to, the US form of capitalism. A quick impression of
this is obtained from a series of commentaries on EU summits in The Economist: “Liberalize? Regulate? Both”
on March 8th 2001, “From Lisbon to Stockholm” on March 29th 2001, “So much for dynamic” on November 1st
2001, “The need for shock treatment” on March 7th 2002, and “Energy and lethargy” on March 21st 2002. On
an assessment of the most recent summit in Barcelona, see also “Assessing Barcelona” in The Wall Street Journal
Europe March 18, 2002.
14ﬂedged analysis of the issue in the remainder of this comment, but I should like to drop a few
quick thoughts.
As I have indicated before, one of the models which rigorously describes an economic rationale
for a GATT-WTO-type world trading system is Bagwell & Staiger (1998 and 1999).7 Ic a n n o t
go into details here, but an important implication of “double-peak” capitalism is quickly pointed
out. The implication follows from a combination of the Bagwell-Staiger paradigm with the model
proposed by Davis (1998) in order to analyze the implications of European-type wage rigidity
for trade between the US and Europe.
The Bagwell-Staiger model shows that the key principles of the GATT-WTO-approach,
viz. non-discrimination and reciprocity, are instrumental in achieving eﬃcient policy equilibria.
They provide vehicles for internalizing externalities that arise in a multi-country world where
governments try to achieve their objectives through policies aﬀecting the terms of trade. Indeed,
if terms-of-trade are the sole concern of national policy makers, then a “non-discrimination cum
reciprocity approach” to world trade can sustain eﬃcient international policy equilibria.T h i s
is true irrespective of the speciﬁc reason why governments try to inﬂuence the terms-of-trade;
it could be normative, as well as of a political-economy nature. The important point is that it
is only the terms-of-trade that matters. As long as this is the case, a GATT-WTO-approach is
politically eﬃcient in that it allows governments to achieve cooperative outcomes.
Now, suppose Europe has an exogenously ﬁxed real wage rate. In principle this wage restric-
tion might be non-binding, but evidence points to the contrary. Intuitively, if a wage constraint
is binding, this is because full employment of labor would require production of certain (labor-
intensive) goods in excess of demand, mirrored — according to Walras’ Law — by excess demand
for other goods (intensive in other factors). The point emphasized by Davis (1998) is that, with
trade between the two regions, European labor bears the full brunt of adjustment from world
commodity markets, as opposed to European markets alone. Davis does not investigate trade
policy, but the implication is clear: Any trade policy pursued by the US which — other things
being equal — reduces its excess demand (and thus world excess demand) for those goods where
labor is used intensively, would alleviate the European unemployment problem.8
Bhagwati’s theory of distortions, of course, should lead us to stress that the ﬁrst-best policy
to get rid of European unemployment is to directly tackle the wage rigidity itself. However,
suppose that, in line with the afore-mentioned role of ideology, Europe does not regard this as
7It is perhaps important to note that there are alternative approaches towards an economic understanding and
evaluation of the GATT-WTO system; see in particular Ethier (1998b).
8In an appendix note, I oﬀer some formal analysis undelying this point.
15an available (or desirable) policy option. Suppose, therefore, that the European policy goal is
to achieve low unemployment at the given real wage rate. The Davis model then implies that
there is an international policy externality which runs through quantities traded, rather than
the terms-of-trade, as assumed in the Bagwell-Staiger model. As noted before, any trade policy
that reduces the excess US (and world) demand for the labor-intensive good at the commodity
price implied by the European wage restriction exerts a positive externality on Europe.
Thus the quantity eﬀects of trade policies become important in their own right, and we are in
a policy environment which is fundamentally diﬀerent from that of the Bagwell-Staiger model.
This is not the place for an in-depth analysis of mutual policy externalities arising in such a
world, but two general conclusions must be pointed out: a) The Bagwell-Staiger rationale for a
GATT-WTO-type world-trading-system may n o th o l di naw o r l do f“ d o u b l e - p e a k ”c a p i t a l i s m .
And b), the options and incentives for bilateral EU-US policies pertaining to international trade
and factor movements in such a world may be quite diﬀe r e n tf r o mw h a tw ew o u l de x p e c tf r o m
traditional trade theory which largely assumes a “single-peak” world.
8 The role of macroeconomic imbalances
An observation made by Sapir brings me to a further point where this issue of “double-peak”
capitalism is of some relevance. In explaining the resurgence of protectionist attempts and the at-
tendant increase in GATT litigation in the 80s, he refers, among other things, to macroeconomic
conditions: exchange rate misalignments, growth downturns, and trade deﬁcits. This begs the
question of whether the macroeconomic environment has also played a role in the recent episode
of trade disputes, particularly with respect to the US and the EU. However, a more interesting
question to ask is whether the macroeconomic imbalances among key world trade regions that
have accumulated in the 1990s are likely to put future attempts at further liberalization under
strain. In answering this question it seems particularly important to acknowledge the previous
point: Not only is European unemployment an important macroeconomic imbalance, but its
relatively rigid economic system and institutions, particularly with respect to the labor market
are likely to persist in the future. In a ﬁrst rough thought experiment it may be warranted to
ignore diﬀerences between European countries, and to use the model sketched in the previous
section to explore avenues of potential conﬂict arising from other macroeconomic imbalances
that have accumulated in the 1990s.
These are in fact well known and don’t need much description: a) an un-sustainable path of
recurring current account deﬁcits in the US (which was not reverted during the recent recession),
b) huge bad debts in the Japanese banking system and an un-sustainable path of deﬁcits and
16accumulating debt of the Japanese public sector, c) a Japanes monetary policy environment
which is characterized by deﬂation and a liquidity, d) an undervalued Euro against the Dollar,
e) increasing output gaps in both Europe and Japan, coupled with a productivity gap vis á vis
the US, e) institutional “imbalances” causing structural rigidities in both Europe and Japan,
and ﬁnally, f) the notorious European unemployment problem.
There are, of course, several ways to correct these imbalances, and it is diﬃcult to foresee
what will happen. However, it is not diﬃcult to imagine that such a correction will put the
international trading-system under strain, either through currency revaluations and associated
expenditure switchings, or through adjustments in expenditure levels. From a European perspec-
tive, in particular, one might be afraid that a turn-around in the US current account position,
and a consolidation of the Japanese banking system and public sector budget might depress
demand also for European goods and, thus, aggravate the European unemployment problem.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine any adjustment without this eﬀect. But there is a further eﬀect
which is somewhat more subtle and which can be identiﬁed using the Davis model sketched
above.
Any adjustment of expenditure levels in speciﬁc macroeconomic aggregates relevant for this
scenario (e.g. US private households, Japanese public sector) will also involve a shift in the
commodity composition of world demand, quite irrespective of whether or not the European
current account position (which is almost in balance) will change or not. In terms of the Davis
model, this implies — other things being equal — that there will be a structural shift in the
non-European excess demand system. It is not clear, a priori, whether this shift will be such
that the European unemployment is aggravated or alleviated. Either is possible, depending
on whether the shift is in favor of those goods using those types of labor intensively where
the European wage constraint is binding. In other words, the policy goal of correcting the
above mentioned macroeconomic imbalances imbalances and the goal of reducing European
unemployment without abandoning the European version of capitalism may be complementary,
or in conﬂict. Clearly, this is a question which can be answered only by means of empirical
analysis.
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This note contains some formal analysis underlying the arguments in the ﬁnal two sections of
this comment
Assumptions and notation:
1. Usual 2-dimensional Heckscher-Ohlin framework, good 2 labor intensive
2. Notation:
• y1,y 2 — outputs, d1,d 2 — demands
• linearly homogenous technology represented by unit-cost functions ci(w,r)
• p2 relative price of good 2, good 1 is numeraire: p1 =1
• w — wage rate, r — capital rental
• K — capital endowment, L — labor endowment, both given exogenously
• linearly homogenous technology represented by unit-cost functions ci(w,r)
3. The two economies are the US and Europe:
(a) The US has perfectly ﬂexible prices
(b) Europe has an exogenous real wage restriction. If Q(1,p 2) is the European expendi-
ture function, then this wage restriction requires
w =¯ w × Q(1.p2) (1)
The European Economy:
1. Zero proﬁt conditions of a competitive equilibrium:
1=c1 [¯ w × Q(1,p 2),r]
p2 = c2 [¯ w × Q(1,p 2),r]
These conditions determine the capital rental and the price of good 2, given the normal-
ization p1 =1 .
r = r(¯ w) (2)
p2 = p2(¯ w) where (3)
∂p2/∂ ¯ w>0 (given the factor intensity assumption) (4)
20Substiting p2(¯ w) back into the wage restriction also gives the wage in terms of good 1:
w = w(¯ w) (5)
2. I now look at the output quantities that would need to be produced for full employment,
given the wage restriction. I deliberately don’t require goods market equilibrium:
L = c1
w [w(¯ w),r(¯ w)] × y1 + c2
w [w(¯ w),r(¯ w)] × y2 (6)
K = c1
r [w(¯ w),r(¯ w)] × y1 + c2
r [w(¯ w),r(¯ w)] × y2 (7)
Hence, the full employment outputs are
y1 = y1 (¯ w,K,L) (8)
y2 = y2 (¯ w,L,K) where (9)
∂y2/∂ ¯ w>0 (given the factor intensity assumption) (10)
These output equations have the usual Rybczynski-property.
3. I now look at European excess demand that would arise if Europe were to fully employ its
labor at a wage rate w = w(¯ w):
δ2(¯ w,K,L)=d2[1,p 2(¯ w),w(¯ w)L + r(¯ w)K] − y2 (¯ w,L,K), (11)
where d2[1,p 2(¯ w),Y] is a Marshallian demand function and δ2 is excess demand for good 2.
Excess demand for good 1 follows from Walras’ law (as I have assumed all factor markets to
clear). The idea is to have all disequilibrium implications caused by the wage restriction
appearing in the excess commodity demand system. If δ2(¯ w,K,L) > 0, then the wage
restriction would not be binding in the EU under autarky,i ft h er e s t r i c t i o na c t u a l l ys a y s
w ≥ ¯ w × Q(1.p2) (instead of requiring equality).
EU-US trade and EU unemployment:
The US has a normal excess demand system, as it is not crippled by any wage restriction.




where for my purpose S is a shift parameter, representing in particular US trade policy and
macroeconomic policies determining the level of US absorption.
The crucial question now is what US excess demand looks like at the point p2 = p2(¯ w),
which is the terms of trade implied by the European trade restriction. If it turns out that
δ∗
2 = δ∗
2[p2(¯ w),S] > 0, then trade alleviates the European unemployment system relative to
autarky, and vice versa. The model can also be used to see how certain trade policy measures
work in such a world of “double-peak capitalism”.
A further avenue of analysis relates to trade policy incentives, policy externalities, and the
rationale (eﬃciency) of the WTO.
Global macroeconomic imbalances and EU unemployment:
21The term S can now be interpreted as determined, among other things, by the size of the
US current account deﬁcit. The point made in the ﬁnal section of my comment relates to
the question of whether a reduction in the US current account deﬁcit increases or lowers δ∗
2
(through its eﬀect on S). The general fear is that correcting macroeconomic imbalances that
have accumulated during the 1990s would lower δ∗
2. But the above analysis suggests that this
is not necessarily the case. Although the model does not easily generalize to many dimensions,
it is clear that such corrections will in general involve a commodity shift in the “non-Europe
excess demand system” (δ∗
2 in the simple model obove). And this shift may, in and of itself,
aggravate or alleviate the European unemployment problem. This is a question which can only
be answered empirically.
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